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Introduction 
 
In general this paper is concerned with issues relating to theoretical and empirical 
discussions regarding the conceptual nature of Europeanization and European 
integration. Through an analysis of British financial services in terms of banking, 
investment and insurance directives, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) the paper identifies both ‘situation’ and 
‘process’ conceptualizations of Europeanization and illustrates its close links with the 
idea of European integration.  
 
Initially, this paper provides a conceptualization of Europeanization and explains its 
relationship with European integration. Second, it provides an overview of changes to 
the British regulatory structure over the last 20 years. Third, the paper explains the 
role of interest group intermediation in the formulation of shared beliefs and 
preference up-loading to EU policy-making institutions. In this context, the paper 
identifies how the concept of a ‘competent authority’ was up-loaded to the EU and 
the how Britain interpreted the downloaded structure in the form of the FSA. In 
addition, the FSA is investigated in its role as a unitary ‘competent authority’ and its 
attempts at policy transfer in championing this model are explored.  Indeed, this 
brings into question the differences between vertical and horizontal policy transfer 
and up-loading. Finally, an analysis of British financial services provides some 
insight into the affects of Europeanization and European integration on the sector, as 
well as the affects the sector has had on Europeanization and European integration. 
Through an analysis of British financial services the study is able to track elements of   3 
European integration as well as up-loading and downloading examples of 
Europeanization. 
 
Conceptualizing Europeanization and European Integration 
 
This paper understands Europeanization in the following way: Europeanization 1 
(En1) entails downloading or top-down Europeanization and is based on 
conceptualizations forwarded by Buller and Gamble (2002), Dyson and Goetz (2002), 
George (2001) and Ladrech (1994). These commentators provide analysis of wider 
perspectives of Europeanization but emphasize En1 because of its clarity in terms of 
explanatory power. Europeanization 2 (En2) incorporates up-loading or bottom-up 
Europeanization and is based on conceptualizations indicated by Börzel (2002), 
Bulmer and Burch (2001), Dyson (1999) and Risse et al (2001). In most instances, 
these conceptualizations emphasize the creation of the EU policy-making structures, 
which border definitions of European integration, rather than the mechanism of 
domestic up-loading. This causes problems when it comes to identifying the 
differences between Europeanization and European integration.  
 
Up-loading can either be seen on a macro level where governments formulate grand 
transformations in terms of the Single European Act (SEA), the Single European 
Market (SEM), Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and Financial Services Action 
Plan (FSAP). Or it can be seen on a micro/meso level where other interests involve 
themselves in the process through interest groupings and networks. This paper 
accepts that governments outline their intention to compromise their positions in 
formulating macro decisions but argues that (especially in relation to the SEM) other 
actors work out the detail of compromise in the realization of regulatory structures. 
As this paper deals with financial services it concentrates on the latter form of up-
loading and explains this in relation to European integration. Consequently, this 
conceptualization of Europeanization perceives institutional linkages in terms of 
governmental activity, interest group intermediation and network interaction and 
identifies these as the means by which preferences are up-loaded to the EU and 
impact on the development of political structures and EU legislation; whereas, 
examples of European integration incorporate the actual transformation of both the   4 
EU political structure (changing political space) and legislation (evolving directives, 
regulations etc). 
 
This approach was partly identified by Featherstone and Kazamias (2001) when they 
considered that domestic structures were not the passive recipients of EU impacts. 
“Domestic and EU institutional settings are intermeshed, with actors engaged in both 
vertical and horizontal networks and institutional linkages” (p 1). They emphasised 
changes brought about on domestic policy in terms of fit or misfit and how the 
member states deal with these. “Europeanization is assumed to be a two way process, 
between the domestic and the EU levels, involving both top-down and bottom-up 
pressures” (ibid, p 6). The success in negotiations between domestic actors at the EU 
level will determine the level of fit or misfit when it comes to policy implementation. 
The level of success regarding up-loading (En2) will determine the level of change in 
relation to downloading (En1). It could be argued that if there has been no misfit at 
the domestic level if change has failed to occur, Europeanization has not taken place. 
This is when it is important to investigate bottom-up processes of Europeanization 
and identify the levels of success in member state up-loading. If member states have 
lobbied effectively and had much of their perspective included in EU policy, misfit 
will be limited and consequent domestic change will be minimal.  This does not mean 
that Europeanization has not taken place but that bottom-up Europeanization was 
effective and top-down Europeanization minimized.  
 
Europeanization is conceptualized in the context of ‘situation’ in terms of 
downloading (En1) or up-loading (En2). Each of these conceptualizations allows 
situations where empirical reliability can be made explicit from a particular 
perspective. However, if the study is to ensure greater depth of understanding of the 
effects of Europeanization on the EU and member states an analysis needs to include 
both En1 and En2 and a move away from Europeanization as ‘situation’ toward 
‘process’. Understanding is further developed when the ‘content’ of Europeanization 
is taken into consider. ‘Content’ includes issues like policy transfer, shared beliefs, 
institutional norms (accountability), informal rules (democracy), discourse (language 
used when discussing issues relating to the EU e.g. EMU) and identities (e.g. does the 
euro provide an EU identity?). (For further see Howell, 2002; 2003; Olsen, 2002 and 
Radaelli, 2000).   5 
 
In addition to difficulties with Europeanization we also encounter conceptual 
problems regarding European integration. For instance, as noted above some 
conceptualizations of Europeanization and European integration seem to be identical 
and in most instances it is extremely difficult to distinguish between them. This paper 
argues that difference exists between Europeanization and European integration 
however, they do continuously interact with each other; for instance the development 
of the supranational level in the context of evolving institutions can be seen as 
European integration. Up-loading or En2 indicates the use of governments or sub-
national interests in the development of European integration and the switch toward a 
new centre of policy-making. 
 
Overall, the EU environment (or political space at the EU level) encompasses 
European integration; up-loading and downloading incorporate Europeanization. On 
the one hand, Europeanization can be seen as the source of change in relation to the 
EU level in terms of European integration and the development of supranationality. 
On the other hand, European integration can be seen as the source of change and 
Europeanization the outcome of change on member state governmental, legal and 
regulatory structures. Fundamentally, we have interactions between Europeanization 
and European integration in the construction and perpetuation of supranational 
institutions and development of EU and domestic policies and systems. 
Europeanization incorporates up-loading from the member states, which can be 
undertaken by government, interest groups, sectors or companies. At some point 
Europeanization becomes European integration (this is difficult to pinpoint because of 
the continual interaction between the two areas) this is where EU institutions develop 
legislation, which is eventually downloaded to member states. Indeed change is 
indicated through European directives and regulations which on the one hand are 
directly downloaded by the EU and on the other downloaded through domestic 
legislatures. In the latter case En1 provides the opportunity for greater interpretation 
and diversity throughout the EU. Through a study of financial services this paper 
illustrates these intricacies (for further on this conceptualization of Europeanization 
and European integration see Howell, 2002 and 2003). 
 
The Structure of the British Financial Services Sector   6 
 
Prior to the SEM British financial service regulatory structures were relatively liberal 
in relation to other EU member states with supervision based on self-regulation. 
Other member states had different regulatory structures that ranged from state-
controlled sectors like Greece, Portugal and Italy; highly regulated sectors like 
Germany and France and more liberal sectors such as the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg (the British regulatory structure was in this category). Overall there 
were different regulatory structures throughout the EU in the 1980s. However, 
through the formulation of the SEM in financial services there was a general 
perception regarding levels of regulation in the EU. In the 1980s member states had 
different beliefs regarding supervision however, by the end of the 1990s there had 
been some convergence of these beliefs. Agreed legislation moved the regulatory 
structures away from self-regulation and state-control and identified a means by 
which shared beliefs could be concretized in the market structure (for further see 
Howell, 1999; 2000). 
 
In the early 1980s the British industry was primarily supervised through the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) with regulation revolving around solvency 
control, which relied on the principle of ‘freedom with disclosure’. Following the 
Financial Services Act (1986), overall control moved to the Treasury but their 
involvement was limited and regulation was implemented through the Securities and 
Investment Board (SIB) and Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs). There were four 
main SROs, which were answerable to SIB: the Securities and Futures Authority 
(SFA), the Investment Management Regulatory Organization (IMRO), the Life 
Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organization (LAUTRO) and the Financial 
Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA). On top of 
this some functions of banks and building societies were regulated by SROs and 
others by the Bank of England and the Building Societies Commission respectively. 
Furthermore, Recognised Investment Exchanges (RIEs) were regulated by SIB and 
the Bank of England, Recognised Clearing Houses (RCHs) by SIB and professional 
firms by both Recognised Professional Bodies (RPBs) and SROs both of which were 
answerable to the SIB. In a practical context, this meant that independent advisers, for 
instance were regulated by the SFA, IMRO and FIMBRA; or unit trust management 
companies by the SFA, IMRO and LAUTRO, which caused confusion for the   7 
consumer, company and regulator. The complicated structure and limited co-
operation between regulators led to issues of under-regulation in terms of mis-selling 
and bad advice. Indeed for the sector itself the situation was problematic, for the 
consumer it was a minefield. There were attempts to clarify the process 1995 when 
LAUTRO and FIMBRA were merged into the Personal Investment Authority (PIA), 
however this did little to deal with the overlapping of competences regarding the 
supervision of the sector. The regulatory structure was supposed to ensure efficient 
expert regulation however, the problem was that although these bodies were 
independent in name they were closely tied to the financial services sector and may 
have been ‘captured’? Indeed in an attempt to move away from self-regulation and 
the problems of capture a statutory independent authority was initiated in 1997; the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). 
 
 
 
Interest Group Intermediation and Up-loading  
 
This paper argues that EU institutions interact with interest groups extensively in 
legislation formulation. Interest groups will be defined as non-governmental 
organizations that attempt to have an influence on public policy. They are entities that 
provide an institutional linkage between sectors and government. More precisely they 
are “those types of organisations whose political task it is to reflect the interests of the 
economic or occupational sections they represent” (Lieber, 1974; p 29).  Interest 
groups are described as “those organisations which are occupied … in trying to 
influence the policy of public bodies in their own chosen direction … European 
interest group … are centrally organised associations of interest group … each of 
which represents either a number of similar groupings or both national groupings and 
European industry committee groupings” (Kirchner, 1980; p 96). Interest groups up-
load sector preferences through the European Commission and Parliament; 
preferences that through European integration are eventually incorporated in policy-
making mechanisms e.g. directives and downloaded to member states. 
 
The SEA created an impetus for the use of interest groups. With Qualified Majority 
Voting (QMV) and the SEM programme, lobbying in Brussels became imperative.   8 
European institutions (especially the Commission and the Parliament) “have 
developed a comprehensive network of contacts that cut across, and are independent 
of, member countries. Increasingly it is necessary for lobbying to be based on broad 
alliances representing a more European perspective. We might think of this process as 
Europeanization” (Andersen and Eliassen, 1991; p 174 author’s brackets). Through 
the use of European-wide interest groups and networks European institutions sector 
preferences are up-loaded into the European integration process or European political 
space. In this way we observe an interaction between Europeanization and European 
integration in the formulation of policy. 
 
European-wide interest groups and supranational institutions make it impossible for 
one Member State to be purely self-interested. Domestic self-interest has become 
intermeshed with other member states; “national self-interest has partly become a 
collective European interest … forty years of working together has resulted in 
collective outputs being produced and recognised by the parties involved” 
(Greenwood, 1995; p 2). If common interests are to exist then they must be based on 
a set of shared beliefs. The European Commission and Parliament consider that 
speaking to European organizations allows an understanding of European-wide 
interests or the shared beliefs of European sectors. Indeed, to ensure effective 
lobbying it is necessary to build coalitions. At the same time both the European 
Commission and the European Parliament stress that they want to speak to European-
wide institutions because this provides shared beliefs and a European rather that 
domestic perspective. This may be made a little clearer through a study of financial 
services and the Third Life Assurance Directive in particular. 
 
The Third Life Assurance Directive: Up-loading, Downloading and European 
Integration 
 
Most financial services companies are members of interest groups and use these to 
influence British policy-making. For instance, in a survey of British life insurance 
companies 100% of respondents subscribed to a national interest group and most of 
these where members of the Association of British Insurers (ABI) (Howell, 1999; 
2000). Indeed, through their membership of the ABI they were automatically part of a 
European wide-interest group or the Comité Européen des Assurances CEA.   9 
  
Insurance interest representation at the EU level is primarily undertaken by the CEA, 
which has operated throughout Europe since 1953. The institution existed before the 
creation of the EEC and this is reflected in its membership, which it is not made up of 
member states alone. “Nevertheless the single most important function of the 
organization is to work through its ‘Common Market Committee’, which is officially 
recognised by the EU and through which all insurance directives pass” (Vipond, 
1995; p 105). This is reflected by the Commission, which considers itself as an 
organization that is always open to external input; input, which can be seen as up-
loading and which Commissioners always welcome. The Commission has “a 
reputation for being accessible to interest groups (because) it is in the Commission’s 
own interest to do so since interest groups can provide the services with technical 
information and constructive advice” (OJ/C 63/02 author’s brackets).  
 
Directorate-Generale XV (DG XV) considered the CEA to be the main representative 
of the insurance industry and was reinforced in a speech by Leon Brittan in 1989 “the 
CEA has proved its worth … as a standard bearer for the insurance industry at the 
European level. I know that DG XV has come to rely greatly on the CEA and its 
officials … as an organisation which is fully representative of the insurance industry, 
which puts your views and concerns to us frankly and powerfully and defends them 
tenaciously” (Sir Leon Brittan, speech given to the CEA November 1989; cited in 
Camerra-Rowe, 1996; p 18). 
These sentiments were supported by a number of interviews undertaken by Howell 
(1999; 2000) and Camerra-Rowe (1996) in which a Commission official indicated, 
“they (the Commission) have almost institutionalised corporatist - like relations with 
the CEA” (p 18 author’s brackets). National interest groups up-load domestic 
preferences to the European interest group; European interest groups provide an 
environment in which different beliefs can be explored and developed into shared 
beliefs of the European sector (of course differences still remain but a consistent 
approach is reached). Shared beliefs are eventually compromised with those pursued 
by the EU for instance in interviews with DG XV representatives considered that they 
pursued ‘the spirit of the treaties’ in their negotiations with interest groupings 
(Howell, 2000). Through this process a regulatory structure is eventually agreed and 
downloaded through the EU and domestic structures. However, the level of   10 
convergence throughout the EU will be tempered (especially with regard to 
directives) through domestic cultures and identities having an impact on 
interpretations of downloaded legislation. Overall, through interest intermediation 
common discourse can evolve which paves the way or provides the basis for vertical 
and horizontal policy transfer. Vertical policy transfer comes through EU policy or 
European integration processes. Horizontal policy transfer incorporates learning from 
and taking on other member state policies without EU involvement.  One may argue 
that the latter does not incorporate En1 because change does not emanate through EU 
structures. However, there are problems with this distinction e.g. member states may 
learn from other member states who have themselves made changes because of 
vertical policy transfer. Through an analysis of the financial services sector in relation 
to up-loading, downloading and European integration the rest of this paper will deal 
with some of these issues. 
 
Up-loading Shared Beliefs 
 
Howell (1999; 2000) indicated that the ABI and CEA were highly involved in the 
creation of the Third Life Assurance Directive. The ABI forwarded a policy of self-
regulation, which was partially taken up by the CEA and DG XV but eventually led 
to a more specific concept of ‘competent authority’ and a less liberal regulatory 
structure than the British life insurance industry would have preferred. However, in 
its proposal for a Third Life Assurance Directive, the European Commission made 
clear that “the internal market in insurance represented a primary goal … in view of 
the importance of this strongly expanding sector”
1. Howell (2000) argued that the 
insurance industry considered that it needed priority treatment because it lagged 
behind the liberalization of the other economic sectors within the financial services 
sector. Directives in the banking industry had already been implemented, and as a 
consequence the insurance industry had been left at a competitive disadvantage in 
relation to these (an example of up-loading (En2) to the EU policy-making 
institutions).  
                                                 
1 Com 91 57 final SYN 329 p 2   11 
 
In the Third Life Assurance Directive this took the form of a more distinct and 
accessible ‘competent authority’ than that which existed in Britain. For instance the 
directive identified that the ‘competent authority’ should introduce appropriate 
safeguards to prevent “irregularities and infringements of the provisions of assurance 
supervision” (OJ 360; 10). Furthermore, the directive indicated that member states 
must have an institution capable of ensuring the “orderly pursuit of business by 
insurance undertakings” (ibid).  Through the SEM, consumers should have wider 
choice; however, they must be provided with enough information to enable choices 
best suited to their needs. Such information is all the more important when the 
contract is of a long-term nature. Consequently the consumer should receive clear and 
accurate information regarding the ‘essential character of the products proposed’ 
(ibid; 23) and an accurately defined complaints procedure. Furthermore, the Second 
Banking Directive indicated that the ‘competent authority’ for credit institutions 
should provide authorization in terms of capital as well as sound prudent management 
(Art 5). Given the problems regarding mis-selling in the British financial services 
sector and difficulties regarding competencies in the regulatory structure these 
stipulations could not have been achieved by the structure that existed in the early 
1990s and some change would be necessary if the directive was to be adhered to. The 
level of change and type of structure was at this point open to interpretation, which 
illustrated the diversity still apparent in applying directives. Indeed, member states 
pursued different models and diversity in relation to regulatory structure still exists 
today. However, in general there does seem to be a shift toward a single statutory 
regulator even though this is not universal.  
 
The Third Life Assurance Directive identified what a regulated market should 
involve. It included regulations approved by the appropriate ‘competent authorities’, 
which should be empowered by national authorities to supervise insurance 
undertakings. Furthermore, the ‘competent authorities’ may also restrict authorization 
of both companies and products (Art 4). So when the FSA gives authorization for 
classes of insurance or companies it is valid for the entire EU (except in the context of 
general good). ‘Competent authorities’ encompass member state authorities that are 
statutorily empowered to supervise insurance undertakings and are able to grant and 
withhold authorization. The ‘competent authority’ should ensure minimum   12 
guarantees and that reputable individuals control and administer companies. It should 
also carry out verification and authorization of a company’s ability to trade in other 
member states (this may be accomplished with the assistance of the member state 
authority in which the company trades) (Arts 5 and 9). However the “financial 
supervision of an assurance undertakings … shall be the sole responsibility of the 
home member state. If the ‘competent authorities’ of the member state of the 
commitment have reason to consider that the activities of an assurance undertaking 
might affect its financial soundness, they should inform the competent authorities of 
the home member state. The latter authorities shall determine whether the undertaking 
is complying with the prudential principles laid down in this Directive” (Art 8, Para 
1). Supervision incorporates levels of solvency, and technical provisions, both 
mathematical and assets covering these provisions in relation to regulations indicated 
by the member state based on principles outlined in the directive. Overall the 
“competent authorities … shall require every assurance undertaking to have sound 
administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms” 
(Art 8, Para 3). 
 
Each member state will need to ensure that its competent authority is able to carry out 
the supervision of companies with head offices in their territories, which includes 
business in other member states. The competent authority must have the powers to 
ensure that council directives are implemented. In a practical context, this means the 
ability to investigate an undertaking in terms of all of its business on the spot and 
insist on documentation being made available.  The competent authority also needs to 
ensure consumer protection in all member states and have the means of enforcement 
at its disposal. It may also make provision for the “competent authorities to obtain 
any information regarding contracts which are held by intermediaries” (Art 10, Para 
C).  
 
During the formulation of the Third Life Assurance Directive, the British life 
insurance industry was involved in successful up-loading and many parts of it could 
have been met by the Personal Investment Authority (PIA) and other existing British 
regulatory structures. However, considering the tasks necessary to supervise cross-
border, and the model of an independent central bank, a single statutory supervisory 
institution best fitted the bill. These issues outlined in the directive would be better   13 
served by a single institution and identified an element of misfit for the UK structure 
(McGee and Heusel, 1995; p 85). Even though up-loading was successful 
downloading necessitated institutional change. As noted above, along with other 
member states Germany has also moved toward a single regulator, a model that seems 
to provide best fit for EU legislation regarding financial services in general. However, 
following the adoption of a single statutory regulator the FSA has been outlining the 
benefits of this model throughout the EU, which illustrates some of the problems 
relating to policy transfer e.g. do German changes to there regulatory structure 
incorporate vertical or horizontal policy transfer? Has Germany learned from other 
member states or has such a convergence been brought about through EU legislation? 
 
Of course, one may argue that national variables and globalization, rather than 
Europeanization, were the impetus behind the creation of the FSA as competent 
authority. For instance problems with the British system had already been realised 
following shortcomings regarding the mis-selling of pensions, the Maxwell affair, 
company and banking collapses e.g. Barings and Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI) and endowment mortgage mis-selling. However, this paper 
argues that even though these variables existed, regulation needed to be brought in 
line with the rest of the EU and En2 or downloading provided a platform for 
uploading British preferences to the EU e.g. the FSA identifying models for future 
EU market and supervisory structures (this is discussed below in the section the FSA 
as Up-loader). 
 
The FSA as downloaded ‘Competent Authority’  
 
As outlined in the directives, as a ‘competent authority’ the FSA aims to promote 
public understanding and maintain confidence in the financial system. This may be 
achieved through ensuring the right balance of consumer protection in terms of 
vetting entry to the market and helping to reduce financial crime. The FSA aims to 
ensure these objectives in an efficient and responsible manner with a balance between 
the burden to the firm and the benefits to the consumer. Protection should be balanced 
to ensure innovation and competition between companies. This in turn will ensure 
competitive UK financial services in the international environment. The PIA dealt 
with many of these issues, but failed to deal with some fundamental problems with   14 
the industry in terms of poor intermediaries, commission and expertise (ibid). Indeed, 
through authorization (outlined in the directives) the FSA is dealing with these issues 
as well as consolidating financial services supervision. In this context we are locating 
examples of downloading through En1 and the differentiation between fit and misfit 
in terms of insurance regulation. 
 
As noted in the directive, to ensure consumer confidence the FSA provides 
authorization of companies as having adequate resources, and fit and proper 
individuals in management. It also aims to ensure fair treatment at the point of sale 
and in the context of on-going information e.g. performance indicators. Overall, the 
FSA investigates unauthorized activities and where necessary fairness in marketing 
and advertising. It is also dealing with mortgage endowment policies and issues of 
redress. These could be noted as examples of En1, however; the European Bureau of 
Consumers Union (EBUC) argued that there is limited access to the SEM because of 
diverse consumer protection rules. Consumers purchasing policies through insurance 
companies from other member states will not know under whose jurisdiction the 
contract resided and will not have adequate protection (McGee and Heusel, 1995). 
The membership of BEUC (member state consumer groups) up-loads (En2) these 
concerns to the EU through the pressure group and promotes the harmonization of 
insurance contract law. 
 
Through En1, the FSA has recently taken on further duties. Following the Insurance 
Mediation Directive responsibility is being downloaded for the regulation of sales of 
insurance products, including home and car policies. Additional responsibilities 
include the regulation of mutual societies, unfair terms in financial services contracts, 
Lloyd’s insurance market, market abuse and applications and supervision of overseas 
investment exchanges. This relies on the effective supervision of investment 
exchanges and financial services in other states or effective downloading throughout 
the EU. Of course, different cultural models will identify different interpretations of 
the directives and this leads to diversification in the EU. As noted above, even though 
up-loading and European integration provide unification, the downloading procedures 
allow flexibility of interpretation and consequent diversity. 
   15 
Vertical or Horizontal Policy Transfer: FSA as Up-loader? 
 
Since its inception FSA representatives have argued at many EU conferences and 
symposia for the completion of the SEM in financial services and a specific form of 
regulatory structure. In some instances this may be seen as an attempt at up-loading 
or vertical of horizontal policy transfer. In this way the FSA could be seen as 
attempting to transfer policy outcomes of downloading regarding a specific model of 
regulation and the future of financial services in the EU. As an outcome of En1, En2 
and European integration the downloaded structure or FSA has become part of the 
process and transfers policy preferences throughout the EU (this could be seen as up-
loading but this may involve ‘conceptual stretching’), which through European 
integration procedures become part of En1 or downloading. It is difficult to determine 
whether the model the FSA forwards and the means by which this is achieved 
incorporates vertical policy transfer, horizontal policy transfer or up-loading. As an 
outcome of En1 the FSA could be seen as proposing EU stipulations and actions as 
vertical policy transfer. However, Britain has interpreted financial services directives 
and the stipulations regarding a competent authority in a specific way. Indeed the 
FSA could be seen as attempting to convince other member states of the superiority 
of the British interpretation and consequent model and in this context its actions may 
encapsulate horizontal policy transfer. 
 
For example, Howard Davies (the head of the FSA) (2000a) argued that formal and 
informal barriers to cross-border trade still existed and further changes were still 
needed. He considered that to deal with the situation, a couple of issues were 
paramount: that the process of legislation needed to be speeded up; and the network 
of EU regulators needed to be strengthened and the regulators themselves given more 
teeth to become more effective. Davies (2000) also argues that regulatory structures 
needed to be developed in response to changing markets at the national, European and 
international levels. Financial markets are not confined by national boundaries, 
especially in the context of the EU. In fact he argued that the EU needed to interact 
with the international community and be attractive to external capital and that 
regulation was not the only barrier to cross-border trade because cultural differences 
also existed. However, primarily Davies argued that regulatory complexity should be 
simplified because even though co-operation between regulators existed the   16 
complexity exacerbated these relationships. Fundamentally he thought that 
considering the change in the industry, regulators should work toward greater 
convergence. 
 
Furthermore Davies (2000a) did not propose a single regulator for securities or 
banking because he thought this would be premature given the diversity regarding 
regulation and cultural interpretation in separate member states. He thought that, 
“without harmonized regulation, or the ability to enforce its regulations, a pan-
European securities regulator would be ineffective” (ibid, p 3). This does suggest that 
if regulation was harmonized, and a pan-European regulator was able to enforce its 
regulations, then such a construct would be effective. However, there would also be 
accountability problems concerning the European Parliament, European Commission 
and member state governments, as well as a contradiction with the principle of 
subsidiarity.  
 
Howard Davies thought similar arguments applied to banking, and that as with most 
sectors in the EU, supervision should be enforced through regulatory networks under 
a common legislative framework (ibid). For instance the Brouwer report (1999) 
considered that EU banking supervision was adequate and would remain so as long as 
regulatory networks were enhanced (see Davies, 2000 and 2000a). These are further 
examples of the FSA not only acting as a regulator in terms of downloading but 
because of a concern for the regulatory structure emerging in the EU, it transfers its 
own perception of acceptable future scenarios and developments. In part the FSA is 
an example of downloading from the EU. Of course, (as identified by other member 
states) it did not need to take this form but the structure does allow it to deal with 
stipulations outlined by directives in an efficient and effective manner. If cross-border 
trade in financial services was to be realized through home country control member 
states were obliged to ensure clear lines of demarcation when it came to regulatory 
structures and the FSA provides this in Britain. However, the FSA also provides an 
example of policy transfer whereby it is involved in discussions regarding inputs to 
EU legislation and activities relating to European integration (which could border on 
up-loading). 
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The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP): Up-loading, European Integration and 
Downloading 
 
The FSA considered that if an SEM in financial services was to be brought into 
existence, a number of trade-offs needed to be realized; for instance what should be 
the balance between competition, innovation and consumer protection?  If regulation 
drives business offshore it may negate consumer benefit. To what extent should 
market integrity be promoted even though it has costs for borrowers and lenders? Of 
course, the answers to these questions would be different for individual member 
states and depend on the sophistication of individual financial systems and 
emphasises that member states will implement different interpretations of EU policy. 
However, implementation should be in line with the parameters of EU policy. Some 
member states have been failing to implement or approve laws in financial services 
and such considerations motivated the British government to support claims by the 
European Commission that it needed more powers to force rogue member states to 
implement EU policy. Without these powers, the Commission argued that the SEM 
would miss its target and fail to become the most competitive economy in the world 
by 2010 (Financial Times, 2003; p 8). Indeed, if Brussels were provided with more 
powers to enforce EU policy implementation, downloading and up-loading would 
intensify and diversity would be limited.  
 
Many of the concerns outlined by the FSA were, through European integration 
procedures, eventually outlined in the FSAP. In such a way attempts at policy transfer 
regarding the structure of the SEM have been taken up in areas of macro up-loading. 
Indeed, it may be argued that the FSA has become a form of up-loader, however the 
mechanisms of this have not yet been investigated in enough detail. The FSAP 
identified five main areas where action was necessary to further facilitate the 
construction of a single market in financial services. These were: an improved 
legislative apparatus, elimination of capital market fragmentation, consumer 
protection within a single market, supervisory co-ordination, and an integrated 
infrastructure to underpin financial transactions. At the European Council meeting in 
Cardiff (1998) the European Commission was invited to prepare a framework for   18 
action for financial services. The European Commission (1998) concentrated on a 
number of main concerns regarding the European financial services market. These 
included, deep and liquid capital markets, which improve services to both issuers and 
investors, and the removal of continuing barriers to retail financial services. This 
would ensure more consumer choice, while at the same time cultivating consumer 
confidence and protection. Further concerns revolved around the need for co-
operation amongst supervisors and an integrated EU infrastructure. Finally, it argued 
for the streamlining and clarification of the EU legislative apparatus and process. This 
provides an example of macro up-loading with member states sharing a set of beliefs 
concerning efficiency, choice and effective regulation in the formulation of the SEM. 
As the FSA is a new institution whether it has extended its role in terms of policy 
transfer to that of macro or micro up-loading is unclear. Such will necessitate further 
investigation. 
 
The main objective of the FSAP was to emphasise mutual recognition over 
harmonization, supervisory institutions needed to collaborate further in the pursuit of 
general conditions for an efficient EU financial market. The plan was endorsed at the 
Cologne European Council in 1999 and was followed by a more detailed strategy in 
March 2002 at the Lisbon European Council. The Lisbon Council indicated a 
completion date of 2005 and a number of short/medium term priorities: these 
included access to investment capital and a review of the Investment Services 
Directive (ISD), a single passport for issuers, co-operations between regulators and 
cross-border comparatives of financial statements. 
 
In a speech Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission, argued that, 
“implementation of the FSAP must not be allowed to falter or fail”. He considered 
that such failure would impact on the EU strategy for “sustainable growth, 
competitiveness, stability, employment and innovation” (cited in European 
Commission, 2002; p 1). In this context, the FSAP is a means by which EU policy 
preferences (brought about through European integration) can be formulated into 
directives and downloaded to member states. It is doing this by working with other 
member states to implement the FSAP by creating a single EU capital market through 
a modernized EU legislative framework, e.g. prospectus and accounting legislation, 
the development of open retail markets and a re-assessment of prudential supervision.   19 
Overall, each part of the ‘process’ may be broken down into ‘situations’, but is best 
understood as a ‘process’ because each constituent part overlaps so full understanding 
necessitates comprehension of each situation in relation to the process as a whole. 
The FSAP is made up of elements relating to macro up-loading, European integration 
and (following involvement from the financial services sector in the form of micro 
up-loading) downloading. 
 
 
 
Downloading Directives: Constructing a SEM in Financial Services  
 
George (2001) argued that downloading or En1 was the clearest example of 
Europeanization.  This may be observed in the financial services sector in the context 
of two co-ordination directives that have primarily affected the European banking 
industry. The First Banking Directive (77/780/EEC) cleared many obstacles to the 
freedom of establishment for banks and other credit institutions, introduced home 
country supervision (supervision by domestic regulators) and a common position for 
the granting of banking licences. However, problems were still apparent and certain 
obstacles needed to be removed before a genuine single market in banking could be 
achieved. Indeed, member states lobbied for further integration through up-loading or 
En2 and established further directives in the quest for a single market in financial 
services. The Second Banking Directive (89/646/EEC) aimed for the removal of 
authorization problems e.g. differentials in supervisory rules and structures and 
definitions of banking activities and cross-border trade. It enabled a single banking 
licence; a list of banking activities and minimum capital levels (5m ECU, now euros, 
laid down for new banks). The directive also provided supervisory rules in terms of 
internal management, audit systems and control levels of major shareholders. 
Furthermore, once banks could trade cross-border other credit institutions lobbied for 
a level playing field in financial services. This illustrates a loop back in the process 
with downloading in one industry bringing about up-loading in another. 
 
For instance following the banking directives the directive on Investment Firms and 
Credit Institutions (CAD) provided the framework for the Investment Services 
Directive (ISD) (93/22/EEC) both directives attempted to create an internal market in   20 
investment services and give all institutions, whether credit or investment firms, the 
ability to offer investment services throughout the EU.  
 
In the UK the First Non-Life Insurance Directive (1973) was downloaded through the 
Consolidated Insurance Companies Act (1974) and the First Life Assurance Directive 
(1979) through the Insurance Companies Act (1982). The Second and Third 
generations of insurance/assurance directives were downloaded through the Insurance 
Companies Act (1994) and along with aspects of the Second Banking Directive 
(1989) through the Financial Services and Marketing Act (FSMA) (2000). However, 
problems still exist in terms of insurance, banking and securities and capital markets 
and further up-loading (En2), downloading (En1) and European integration is still 
apparent and ongoing in the financial services sector. 
 
In other parts of the sector the interaction between En1, En2 and European integration 
took place regarding the formulation and implementation of the Co-Insurance 
Directive (78/473/EEC), the Credit and Surety ship Assurance Directive amending 
Directive (87/343/EEC), and the Legal Expenses Directive (87/344/EEC). Later, 
more specific, directives include the Council Directive on the Annual Accounts and 
Consolidated Accounts of Insurance Undertakings (AACAIU) (91/674/EEC) and the 
Council Directive setting up an Insurance Committee (IC) (91/675/EEC). The IC (the 
membership is made up of experts regarding insurance from the private and public 
sectors throughout the EU) examines questions relating to the application of existing 
directives and the preparation of new legislation proposals in the insurance sector. 
Indeed, the IC provides a forum for up-loaded preferences to be discussed on a 
technical level and like the BAC, indicates the close proximity and blurred edges 
between En2 and European integration. 
 
The AACAIU proposed the harmonization of EU insurance accounting practices, 
which was necessary if valuation and solvency indicators were to be uniform, again 
this provides an illustration of downloading. Also under discussion during the early 
nineties was the proposal for a Council directive on the co-ordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to insurance contracts. This was 
discontinued in 1993 following a tentative compromise reached through the idea of 
the general good.  This is where member states can protect domestic consumers   21 
through barring certain products from their territories. Initially, one might argue that 
in this context En2 and European integration were unsuccessful because the EU was 
unable to bring about convergence through agreement between member states. 
However, general good involves four stringent tests, which incorporate: public 
interest test = public interest reasons that justify restrictions, duplication test = public 
interest is not protected in member state where providers are established, non-
discriminatory test = applies to all, and the proportionality test = the same result 
cannot be obtained from less restrictive regulation. General good intends to provide 
balance between public interest of consumers in individual member states and the 
creation of a SEM in insurance. Fundamentally, to ensure the judicial application of 
these tests clear demarcations regarding competent authorities and their 
responsibilities are necessary in all member states. 
 
Insurance directives only partially regulate cross-border activity, and at the same time 
as we witness En2 and European integration through three generations of directives, 
paradoxically we also see diversity of interpretation through member state regulation 
or En1. As noted, general good also identified the necessity of clear demarcation 
regarding ‘competent authorities’ throughout the EU. The directives indicate that 
‘competent authorities’ should regulate financial services products and activities and 
ensure consumer protection. As member states must allow financial service 
companies supervised by other ‘competent authorities’ to trade in their territories, and 
interpret ‘general good’, there needs to be a high level of clarity and confidence 
regarding regulatory institutions. As recognition between ‘competent authorities’ 
evolve, ‘general good’ becomes less necessary. As confidence between member state 
regulators emerges there will be little need to evoke what could be seen as a barrier to 
trade. Furthermore, the implementation of the EC Unfair Contract Terms Directive in 
1993 reduced the extent that insurance contracts could be used as NTBs. However, 
member states find difficulty in reaching a compromise in these areas because of 
sovereignty, identity and cultural issues.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper attempts to overcome a number of problems relating to conceptualizations 
of Europeanization and the difference between Europeanization and European   22 
integration. Europeanization can be understood from an En1 (top-down) or an En2 
(bottom-up) perspective. European integration comprises the environment on which 
Europeanization impacts or from which it emanates. However, it is more complicated 
than this, with interaction between the two areas merging into one another for 
different lengths of time and with differing levels of intensity. This means that at 
different times the emphasis on Europeanization will either be based around 
mechanisms of change in terms of up-loading from the domestic to the EU level, or 
downloading from the EU to the domestic level. The success of the member state in 
terms of up-loading will have implications when it comes to downloading in respect 
of impacts and change on the domestic environment. The success in up-loading will 
affect misfit and consequently have an impact on downloading in the context of fit. 
One may argue that this is why in most instances both En1 and En2 need to be 
brought into the equation.  
 
In the context of financial services there is up-loading and downloading as well as 
European integration in the formulation of directives and the regulatory structure. 
However, when these separate parts of the process are identified it is difficult to break 
them down as each ‘situation’ overlaps the other. Furthermore, ‘content’ in the form 
of shared beliefs and policy transfer may also be observed. This may be seen clearly 
when we look at the Third Life Assurance Directive, ‘competent authorities’, the 
FSA, and the FSAP. The FSAP indicated that a SEM in financial services had been 
under construction since 1973. Following the shared belief between member states 
that a SEM was necessary, domestic and European interest groups up-loaded 
preferences to EU policy-making institutions, which through European integration 
processes formulated legislation that was then downloaded to member states. 
Furthermore, believing the drive toward a single market in financial services had 
faltered there was further macro uploading of shared beliefs by member state 
governments and through this up-loading and European integration processes the 
FSAP was formulated (in this way we observe an interaction between macro up-
loading and European integration). The implementation of the FSAP then builds on 
previous attempts to provide a SEM in financial services, which involves the 
utilization of micro up-loading in the creation of rules and regulations for 
downloading (this is achieved through the realization of shared beliefs at the micro 
level). In this context, we can observe the formulation of directives (through micro   23 
up-loading and European integration) in banking, insurance and capital markets. 
These directives and regulations are then downloaded to member states where 
different interpretations of policies are implemented. Unification does take place but 
paradoxically there is room for cultural diversity. 
 
In terms of the ‘competent authority’, downloaded through the directives, Britain 
adopted the single regulator model of the FSA. This has since developed its role and 
begun to take an active part in policy transfer throughout the EU, which involved 
some interaction with European integration, however it remains to be seen whether 
the FSA will become a full time active up-loader. Europeanization is made up of En1 
and En2, which incorporate the outcomes and in-puts of European integration, as well 
as the interaction between these ‘situations’ through ‘content’ fit/misfit and impacts.  
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